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SELF-ASSEMBLING GAMES
JEFFREY A. BARRETT AND BRIAN SKYRMS
Abstract. We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signaling
games may initially evolve from ritualized decisions and how more complex
games may evolve from simpler games by polymerization, template transfer,
and modular composition. Modular composition is a process that combines
simpler games into more complex games. Template transfer, a process by which
a game is appropriated to a context other than the one in which it initially
evolved, is one mechanism for modular composition. And polymerization is
a particularly salient example of modular composition where simpler games
evolve to form more complex chains. We also consider how the evolution of
new capacities by modular composition may be more efficient than evolving
those capacities from basic decisions.
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theorists analyze equilibria and dynamics of games that are
simple enough to be amenable to analysis. The question of the origin of the games
studied naturally arises. Social interactions seldom come as neatly structured as
the simple games used to model them. So where do the games come from?
On one reading, the question may seem superficial. If this is a problem for the
theorist, it seems to be in principle no more of a problem for the game theorist than
for any other modeler. A model of an airplane wing in flight, or of a bridge with
traffic and wind, is of necessity a simplification of the complex real system being
modeled. The theorist tries to capture the essence of the phenomena in a form
simple enough to be amenable to analysis. This can be done poorly or well—end
of discussion.
But there is another version of the question that is deeper. Games model re-
peated problems of interactive decision. We can ask: How do these games them-
selves form? How do the bits and pieces of decisions assemble into games? How
did individuals, in dealing with the world, come to interact in such a way that the
interactions can usefully be characterized as a game with specified players, strate-
gies, information, order of play and payoffs? And, more generally, how might such
games themselves evolve? These are theoretical questions worth investigating.
Our focus here will concern how decisions assemble into games, how games may
come to be appropriated to contexts that differ from those in which they are initially
played, and, in particular, how simple games assemble into more complex games.
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There are other aspects of the topic that call for consideration, but we take this to
be a suitable place to start.1
In what follows we consider a number of types of self-assembly. We concentrate
on signaling, although the general perspective applies to other kinds of interaction
as well. One might, for example, use the framework discussed here to consider a
public goods game evolving to work jointly with a bargaining game. We restrict our
attention to signaling games, however, for two reasons. To begin, signaling games
are well-studied and the considerations here help to unify recent work on signaling
systems in particular. But also, signaling games may evolve to implement simple
algorithms that might, by composition, evolve to implement more general forms of
computation. We will consider examples of this when we discuss the composition
of addition and ordering judgments and the composition of logical operations.
Throughout, some sort of adaptive dynamics will be fundamental to the analysis.
We will consider a small handful of different dynamical processes including simple
reinforcement learning, reinforcement with punishment, and reinforcement with
invention of new behaviors.2
There will also be a basic structure that characterizes each game. This structure
will specify the possible situations that may obtain, the stimuli to which the agents
are sensitive, the responses to which they are capable, and the rewards engendered
by the combination of actions in the situation at hand. The dynamics indicates
how agents’ dispositions to respond to stimuli evolve over time. The game structure
itself may evolve, as it does in the case of reinforcement with invention. And the
agent’s dispositions to respond may be appropriated to new tasks. These new tasks
may involve taking as input new aspects of nature or the actions of agents in other
games. In addition to evolving new games, the modular composition of games may,
under appropriate circumstances, provide more efficient paths toward the evolution
of complex dispositions.
2. The Assembly of Decisions into Games: Cue Reading, Sensory
Manipulation, and Signaling
Consider the origin of signals by the process of ritualization suggested by Tinber-
gen [1952], Lorenz [1966], and Huxley [1966]. Individuals of type S just happen to
produce a cue that individuals of type R learn to read. Then an adaptive dynamics
sets up a positive feedback that ritualizes the cue, so that it is used as a signal.
1Note that decisions, at least in the sense we have in mind here, are just agent actions or behaviors
that might be reinforced. As such, they presuppose no deliberation or even the capacity for rational
reflection.
2See (Erev, and Roth [1998]), (Barrett and Zollman [2009]), and (Skyrms [2010]) for discussions of
these and other closely-related evolutionary processes. Regarding the adaptive dynamics employed
in the models, other things being equal, we use the simplest that readily illustrates the particular
phenomena of interest.
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For instance, an animal may naturally bare its teeth before biting, with feedback
amplifying the behavior so that it becomes a ritualized threat signal. The process
may lead to complicated signals in simple animals. Scott, et al. [2010] investigate
complex vibratory signals of ownership in the caterpillar Drepana acurata. These
combine vibrations produced by anal scraping, using specialized organs, with those
produced by drumming or scraping their mandibles. Using comparative morphology
and comparative territorial behavior across many species, they conclude that anal
scraping is a ritualized form of the vibrations made by ordinary locomotion and
the vibrations produced by the mandibles are ritualized fighting behavior. In this
species they are combined to form a warning signal of ownership of territory that
will be defended.
Suppose that there is a situation where different potential ritualized signals may
be sent, depending on the state of the sender, and different behaviors may be
appropriate if the receiver reads those signals well. The situation might involve
fighting, mating, or anything else that might influence the actions of the receiver.
A particularly salient example is that of the predator-specific alarm calls that
are found in many species.3 In the process of becoming ritualized signals, a number
of decisions on the part of sender and receiver become bundled together as a game.
There is a state of the sender, which nature chooses according to some probability.
The sender performs an act that sends a signal, where the signal sent (or better, its
probability of being sent) depends on the sender’s state. The receiver observes the
signal and chooses some act with a probability that depends on the signal received.
The act has payoff consequences for both sender and receiver. The individuals
involved certainly need not think of this as a game; they may not think at all.
Signaling games may form in a variety of ways. There is evidence that the males
of some species may have evolved signal types that exploit preexisting female sen-
sory biases for the purpose of mating. One well-studied example is the Physalaemus
pustulosus species group of frogs. The females across the species in the group share
preferences for a particular set of call features. One of these, for example, is the
presence of low-frequency “chucks.” While males in one species may exploit one
of these preexisting preferences, males in a sister species may exploit another. It
is argued that the best explanation is that the males in each species have evolved
calls that exploit the shared preexisting preferences of the females and, as it hap-
pens, have ended up exploiting different preferences in the context of the different
species.4
3See, for example, (Cheney and Seyfarth [1992]) and (Manser et al. [2002]).
4See (Ryan and Rand [1993]). See also (Endler [1993]) and (Dawkins and Guilford [1996]) for
further discussion of the exploitation of preexisting sensory biases in the evolution of signaling.
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The formation of a signaling game by the exploitation of a preexisting sensory
bias might also be understood as ritualization. The female frogs are attracted by
particular sound, so the male frogs evolve to send mating signals that incorporate
that sound. Just as a receiver might evolve to exploit the fixed dispositions of a
sender to act in a particular way given the state of nature, here it is the sender who
evolves to signal in a way that exploits the receiver’s preexisting dispositions to act
in a particular way given, in this case, a particular type of sound. And a game may
be formed by the process of ritualization with positive feedback.
But to speak of “positive feedback” here is to trade specificity for vagueness, as a
number of mathematically precise realizations of evolution, imitation, and various
types of learning have been rigorously analyzed for a wide variety of simple signaling
games.5 In such games, the positive feedback mechanism is represented by a specific
evolutionary or learning dynamics that determines the payoffs for the senders and
receivers and how these payoffs influence their further actions. It is this dynamics
that may ultimately forge a ritualized signaling system. When it does, one has an
evolutionary model for the formation of that system.
Three simple two-agent games are suggested by such considerations. The first
is a cue-reading game, the second a sensory-manipulation game, and the third a
signaling game. In a cue-reading game, an agent evolves to take advantage of
nature’s fixed dispositions or the fixed dispositions of another agent who comes
to play the role of a sender. In a sensory-manipulation game, a sender evolves to
exploit the fixed dispositions of an agent who comes to play the role of a receiver.
And each of these games might be understood as simplified versions of a signaling
game where a sender coevolves to respond to nature and a receiver coevolves to
respond to the sender’s ritualized signals in a way that is advantageous to both.
In a two-agent cue-reading game, an actor performs some regular fixed action in
response to a particular corresponding state of nature. The exploiting agent then
observes this action and performs an action of his own. If the exploiter’s action is
successful, he reinforces his disposition to perform that type of action conditional
on the actor’s performing the corresponding action. And if it is unsuccessful, he
does not reinforce, and may even weaken, this conditional disposition. Here the
exploiter may quickly evolve to cue his actions to the behavior of the actor and
hence take advantage of the actor’s fixed dispositions to respond to nature.6
5See, for examples, (Hofbauer and Huttegger [2008]), (Argiento et al. [2009]), (Barrett and Zollman
[2009]), (Skyrms [2010]), (Hu et al. [2011]), and (Barrett [2013a]).
6Where the actor and exploiter have few available types of action, even simple Herrnstein rein-
forcement learning (Herrnstein [1970]) very quickly leads to successful cue-reading on simulation.
Note that the evolutionary task here is typically much easier than the task of coordinating signals
and acts in a signaling game inasmuch as the actions of the actor are already fixed in a cue-reading
game. The evolution of perception may be modeled by such a game. Indeed, a one-agent cue-
reading game, where the agent takes her cues from nature directly, provides a plausible account
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In a sensory-manipulation game, the sender evolves to takes advantage of the
fixed dispositions of the receiver in a similar manner. The sender observes the state
of nature and sends a signal. The receiver acts in a fixed way on the signal with
no choice. If the action is successful, the sender reinforces her dispositions to send
that type of signal on the present state of nature. And if is unsuccessful, she does
not reinforce, and may even weaken, this conditional disposition.
In a signaling game, the sender observes the state of nature, then sends a signal.
The receiver observes the signal, then performs an action. They may begin by
randomly signaling and acting. If the receiver’s action is successful, then the sender
reinforces the signal sent conditional on the state of nature that obtained and the
receiver reinforces his action conditional on the signal he observed. And if the action
is unsuccessful, the agents do not reinforce, and may even weaken, these conditional
dispositions. In some cases one can prove that such signaling games converge to
signaling systems, and in many cases, the agents evolve successful signaling on
simulation.7 Here the signals become ritualized through the reinforcement of the
sender’s dispositions to respond to nature with signals and the receiver’s dispositions
to respond to signals with actions.
As illustrated in Figure 1, in a Lewis signaling game the first player, the sender,
knows something that the second player, the receiver, does not know. This is
represented by nature choosing a state t1 or t2. The sender can only send an
arbitrary signal s1 or s2. The receiver observes the signal and takes an action.
The interaction is successful, and the payoff to each player is 1, if the receiver
chooses a1 when nature picked t1 or if the receiver chooses a2 when nature picked
t2. Otherwise, the payoff is 0.
A cue-reading game is a Lewis signaling game that has been pruned as indicated
by the shaded region of Figure 2. Here the sender has no choice and displays cue s1
in state t1 and no cue, which we will indicate by s2, in state t2. The receiver
observes the cue and takes an action.
A sensory-manipulation game is a Lewis signaling game that has been pruned
as indicated by the shaded region of Figure 3. Here the receiver has no choice and
does act a1 on signal s1 and act a2 on signal s2.
Just as the cue-reading and sensory-manipulation games can be understood as
simplified versions of a Lewis signaling game, they might also be understood as
for how the actor may have evolved her fixed dispositions in response to the various states of
nature in the first place. See (Isaac [2011], section 5.4.1) for a discussion of perception and the
information content of perception that fits well with a one-agent cue-reading model.
7See (Skyrms [2010]) for an extended discussion of such games and their properties.
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t1 t2
s1 s2
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Nature
Sender
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Payoff1 1 10 0 0
s1 s2
a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2
Figure 1. A signaling game
t1 t2
s1 s2
01
Nature
Sender
Receiver
Payoff1 1 10 0 0
s1 s2
a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2
Figure 2. A cue-reading game
evolutionary steps in the direction of a signaling game as the agents’ decisions are
ritualized.8
Ritualization, then, may act to form cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, or sig-
naling games from decisions. Such games may, then, be extended as other agents
exploit established behaviors or form new signaling connections by ritualization. In
this sense, one might think of the ritualization of decisions as the glue that binds
agents to form simple games from their basic decisions, then increasingly complex
games from simple games.
8Cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signaling games may differ from each other by degree. A
cue-reading game where the sender’s initial dispositions are relatively fixed might look increasingly
like a signaling game if both the sender and receiver are rewarded for the receiver’s actions, further
reinforcing the sender’s initial dispositional bias.
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s1 s2
01
Nature
Sender
Receiver
Payoff1 1 10 0 0
s1 s2
a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2
Figure 3. A sensory-manipulation game
3. Polymerization
The optimal act on receiving a signal may include sending another signal to one
or more other agents. Suppose that some individuals learn to do this. Then, in
appropriate circumstances, they may spontaneously self-assemble to form chains of
senders and receivers to pass information along. For example consider alarm calls
that indicate that a dangerous predator is on the prowl nearby. Individuals who
have not seen the predator may repeat the alarm, and pass along the information.
Consider a simple homogeneous single-species signaling chain. The first member
of the chain spots the predator and gives the appropriate alarm call. This individual
is in a different game from the other participants—observing the predator and giving
the call. The others are all in the same game, observing a call given and giving a
call in turn. They have adopted the simple strategy of repeating the call. They
have self-assembled into a chain or a more complicated network, whose topology is
determined by the contingencies of space and time.
Signaling chains may even cross species lines. The Vervet monkeys studied by
Cheney and Seyfarth [1992] understand alarm calls of the Superb Starling. Hornbills
understand the alarm calls of Diana monkeys (Rainey et al. [2004]). Some bird
species have learned to understand each others alarm calls (Magrath et al. [2009]).
Here at least one species has a more complicated strategy in a more complicated
signaling game that takes as inputs both the alarm calls of other species and those
of its own, and outputs alarm calls of its own species. Then self-assembly proceeds
as before. Simple signaling modules are strung together to form signaling chains
and signaling networks.
The structure of the signaling network in these examples is evanescent, depending
on who is where when. But there are other examples where the structure of the
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network is endogenous. Given the costs and benefits, individuals who have learned
to react to a signal to their advantage and to “pass it along” may, for example,
self-assemble to form rings or stars.9
Ritualization of the sort that forms cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and sig-
naling games in the first place may also do the work of connecting established
signaling modules. Suppose that a sender S and a receiver R may have established
a signaling system by ritualization. A new agent E1 who is sensitive to the signaling
actions of S may, by reinforcement learning on his own success and failure, learn
to read cues and benefit from S’s signals just as S and R do. Then another agent
E2 who attends to the actions of E1 may learn to read cues to his profit. And so
on. As new agents are added, the composite game grows in complexity and allows
for increasingly subtle connections between agents.10
The formation of signaling chains has been simulated.11 If one simply places
players in a long chain, and requires them to learn to signal de novo, it may take a
very long time.12 In some cases, however, the successful evolution of chains may be
certain to happen in the limit for chains of arbitrary length.13 And if individuals
have already learned their strategies in simpler contexts, then self-assemble, the
evolution of a chain can be quite rapid (Skyrms [2009]).
4. Template Transfer
Template transfer explains how a game that evolved in one context might come
to be used successfully in a new context.
When in equilibrium, the agents playing a signaling game have stable disposi-
tions. These stable dispositions might be understood as implementing a rule that
takes whatever stimuli to which the senders are sensitive as inputs, and which out-
puts the actions of the receiver. Template transfer occurs in a signaling game when
such an evolved rule is appropriated to a context different from that in which it
initially evolved. It involves the evolution of an analogy between the stimuli of the
old evolutionary game and a new set of stimuli that characterizes a new game. In
many cases the appropriation of an old rule to a new context may be significantly
more efficient than evolving a new rule from scratch.
9See (Bala and Goyal [2000]) for the description of a ring-forming game and (Huttegger and
Skyrms [2013]) for a proof that such networks form under the trial-and-error dynamics of probe
and adjust.
10Note that what passes as an agent in such games is very simple. It is nothing more than a
system that might condition its actions on the actions of other systems. As will be particularly
relevant in the next section, an agent may be profitably thought of as a functional unit, among
other functional units, in a single organism.
11See (Skyrms [2009]) for a discussion of how signaling chains may evolve.
12Even a chain of just three players where the new player is placed between the other two, takes
a very long time to evolve (Skyrms [2009]).
13For a discussion of this see Jonathan Kariv’s [2014] Ph.D. thesis on binary signaling chains.
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An example of template transfer is illustrated in the transitive-inference be-
havior of Pinyon Jays Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus and Scrub Jays Aphelocoma
californica.14
In an experiment reported by Alan B. Bond, Alan C. Kamil, and Russell P. Balda
[2003], seven stimulus colors were arranged in a random linear order that was fixed
for each bird. The birds were then presented with two keys, each illuminated with
a different color. If a bird pecked the key illuminated with the higher-ranked color,
then it was rewarded.
The birds were initially presented with only adjacent color pairs: red and green,
green and blue, . . . , or cyan and orange, and the position of the higher-ranked
stimulus randomized between left and right keys on each trial. New color pairs
were gradually added as the birds exhibited success in correctly selecting higher-
ranked colors. Each of the birds was eventually required to track all six adjacent
color pairs. The Pinyon Jays learned to choose the higher-ranked color better than
0.85 of the time. The Scrub Jays learned more slowly, but eventually reached a
similar level of accuracy.
The birds were then presented with nonadjacent color pairs to determine whether
the birds would order the nonadjacent color pairs based on what they had learned
from their experience with just the adjacent color pairs. Both species immediately
exhibited a high level of accuracy on the trials involving the nonadjacent colors,
where the experimenters understood accuracy as judgments that matched the color
order that the experiments had initially assigned to the colors. The Pinyon Jays
chose the higher-ranked color in the full ordering with an accuracy of 0.86 for
nonadjacent pairs, and the Scrub Jays with an accuracy of 0.77.
Interestingly, the two species exhibited different types of error and different la-
tencies depending on the particular elements in the full color ordering that were
presented. This suggests that the two species employ different mechanisms in mak-
ing their ordering judgments for nonadjacent pairs. Nevertheless, both species did
well judging nonadjacent color pairs after being trained on just adjacent color pairs.
The experimenters concluded that the birds were making transitive inferences
based on their experience in the first part of the experiment. But the birds were
doing more than that. In particular, since an ordering on adjacent color pairs does
not determine an ordering on non-adjacent pairs, the birds were imposing a linear
ordering on their learned ordering of adjacent colors. It is only by appropriating
a preexisting linear template that the birds could get from their experience with
adjacent color pairs to judgments that immediately agreed with the experimenters
14This section reports selected results from (Barrett [2013b], [2014a], [2014b]). See those papers
for further details regarding the model described in this section. See (Barrett [2013b]) as well for
an alternative model.
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predetermined full linear order. Indeed, that the experimenters themselves took
the birds’ judgments on nonadjacent color pairs to be correct and simply inferen-
tial suggests that the experimenters were also appropriating a preexisting linear
template to their understanding of the birds’ experience.
The evolution of an ordering rule and the subsequent appropriation of that rule
to order a new type of stimuli can be modeled by a simple signaling game and its
appropriation to a new context.
Consider a signaling game with two senders, A and B, and a receiver R. The
senders and receiver may be understood as functional elements of a single bird.
Nature chooses at random and without bias two stimuli from a set of seven, and
one is presented to each sender, a to A and b to B. The stimuli, which might
be represented by the natural numbers 1 through 7, are ordered, with the order
represented in the payoffs of the game. The two senders react to the stimuli by
sending signals to the receiver, who performs one of three types of act: (0) a > b,
(1) a < b, or (2) a = b. The receiver’s act will count as successful if and only if
it correctly represents the predetermined order of the stimuli to the two agents A
and B. The agents evolve an ordering template here if they coevolve signals that
represent the possible stimuli and a dispositional rule for linearly ordering them
that typically produces successful actions by the receiver.15
Suppose that the agents learn by reinforcement with invention.16 On this dy-
namics, one might imagine that each sender has an urn corresponding to each
possible stimulus and that each urn begins with just a single black ball. When
presented with a particular stimulus, each sender draws a ball at random from the
corresponding urn. If the ball is black, a new signal type is invented and sent to the
receiver; otherwise, a signal of the type of the drawn ball is sent. The receiver also
has an urn corresponding to each ordered pair of signals he might receive. And if
he gets a new signal type, he introduces corresponding urns to represent the new
possible pairs. Each of the receiver’s urns begins with a single ball of his three
act types: a > b, a < b, and a = b. If successful, the ball drawn from each urn is
returned and a new ball of the signal or act type used in that play of the game is
added to the urn; otherwise, the ball drawn from each urn is just returned. Finally,
newly invented signal types are only kept and reinforced if they lead to a successful
act the first time they are used. Thus the game itself evolves.
15Compare to Ariel Rubenstein’s discussion of linear order in the second chapter of (Rubenstein
[2000]).
16See (Skyrms [2010]), (Argiento [2009]), and (Alexander et al. [2012]) for descriptions of this
dynamics and its properties. We consider this adaptive dynamics here as it shows how the agents
might both invent a representation for the stimuli and develop successful ordering dispositions
with modest evolutionary resources. This invented representation is then appropriated to a new
task.
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On simulation, the senders begin by quickly inventing an assortment of new
signals that they initially send more or less randomly. Consequently, the receiver
initially acts pretty much at random. After 107 plays, however, the cumulative
success rate is typically (0.99) better than 0.75; and, in general, the more plays,
the better the cumulative success rate.
The composite system might be thought of as having evolved to implement
a dispositional rule that takes naturally ordered stimuli as input, represents the
stimuli as signals, then outputs an act that reliably indicates the natural order of
stimuli. Once evolved, this dispositional rule might be appropriated as a template
to represent and judge the natural order of a new type of stimuli.
Such a template might be fit to a new context by coordinating the new stimuli
with the old inputs to the dispositional rule. The association of the new stimuli
with the old inputs to the dispositional rule might be thought of as implementing
an analogy between the new and old stimuli. When such an analogy evolves, the
old dispositional rule evolves to treat the new stimuli similarly to how it treated
the old stimuli that were involved in forging the old dispositional rule. This sort of
template transfer might be evolutionarily favored when the process that coordinates
the new stimuli to the old inputs is more efficient than evolving a new rule for the
new context.
We investigate this possibility by considering a simple model. Consider a new
ordered set of stimuli represented by the first seven letters of the greek alphabet α
to η. Suppose that the agents in the last game have already evolved a dispositional
rule for representing and ordering the old stimuli 1 to 7, but that they must learn to
represent and linearly order the new greek stimuli to be successful. The old evolved
dispositional rule might be used as a template for ordering the new stimuli if the
agents can evolve to associate the new stimuli to the old inputs in a one-to-one
way.17
Suppose that nature chooses at random and without bias two stimuli from the
set α to η, and one is presented to each sender A and B. Each sender has an
urn corresponding to each of the new stimuli types (Figure 4). Each of these urns
initially contains one ball corresponding to each of the old sender urns 1 to 7. When
presented with a new stimulus, each sender draws a ball at random from one of
her new greek urns, then draws a ball from the old arabic urn indicated on the
ball from the first draw, then sends the signal indicated on the second draw to the
receiver. Since the agents have already evolved a dispositions that order the old
stimuli (and hence the old arabic urns), the agents just need to learn to associate
17If there were fewer new stimuli than old stimuli, the agents might be successful even if their
association of the new stimuli to the old inputs was not one-to-one, but still respected the natural
order of the new stimuli.
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the new greek urns with the old arabic urns in a way that respects the new linear
order to be successful on the new stimuli.
Nature Translation urns Old urns
Stimulus a
Stimulus b
α β γ δ
ηζ
α β γ δ
ηζ
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
a > b
a < b
a = b
Act
Figure 4. A simple example of template transfer
We will suppose that the agents learn on this new game by simple reinforcement
with punishment, where success is determined by whether the results of the re-
ceiver’s judgments match the natural order of the new stimuli.18 More specifically,
if, on a particular play of the game, the agents choose balls from greek urns that
indicate arabic urns that produce signals that lead the receiver to correctly order
the new stimuli, then each sender returns her ball to the greek urn from which it
was drawn and adds a copy of the same ball type; otherwise, she discards the ball
she drew unless it was the last ball of its type in the urn, in which case, she simply
returns it to the urn.19
On simulation, the agents typically (0.995 on 1000 runs) evolve to successfully
match the new greek stimuli to the corresponding old arabic ordering system with
an accuracy better than 0.80 with 105 plays per run. Here the receiver’s dispositions
are already well-tuned to making successful linear ordering judgments on the old
stimuli. The senders, then, just need to evolve a successful analogy between the
old and new stimuli.
With respect to modeling the behavior of the jays, when the old dispositional rule
evolves in the context of ordering arabic inputs and the new association urns are
18Our strategy regarding the adaptive dynamics is to use the simplest sort for the explanation at
hand. Using reinforcement with invention to evolve the ordering dispositions in the basic game
explains how the birds might invent an internal representation and the associated dispositions.
Reinforcement with punishment explains how this invented system might be transferred to a new
context on a simple dynamics.
19Note that the contents of the old arabic-ordering urns do not change on plays of this game, and,
hence, the template is assumed to be fixed. One could allow the template to itself evolve as it is
transferred. This might better tune the template to the new context, but that would also involve
a different game than the one discussed here.
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trained on just adjacent greek inputs, the new composite system evolves to judge
the full order of greek stimuli with an accuracy better than 0.80. Here the composite
system sometimes evolves to match greek to arabic stimuli in a one-to-one manner
that respects the full arabic ordering, but more typically the arabic ordering rule is
used to group the greek stimuli into two or three linearly ordered segments. Within
each segment, the composite system does very well in ordering both adjacent and
nonadjacent greek stimuli. Between segments, the judgments are less reliable, but
in aggregate, the composite system does about as well as the judgments of the jays
when they apply a prior linear-order template to their experience of only adjacent
color pairs.20
5. Modular Composition
Modular composition occurs when a game comes to accept the play of another
game as input, thus forming a composite game. Here the stimuli to which the
agents in one game are sensitive are the actions of agents playing other games.
Polymerization is a special case of modular composition. More generally, modu-
lar composition of simple games may lead to heterogeneous networks of arbitrary
topology.
There are two aspects to modular composition. The first concerns how the inputs
to the component modules are determined. The second concerns how modules come
to interpret the actions of other modules to allow for successful coordinated action.
Concerning the first, the natural saliences for an agent are determined by the
perceptual apparatus of the agent. For the purposes at hand, we will simply stipu-
late what each agent responds to, then consider how they might evolve to use these
inputs and other evolved dispositions for successful action. Of course, an agent’s
natural saliencies might themselves evolve on feedback from her success and failure
in action.
Concerning the second, games may come to interpret the actions resulting from
the play of other games by the same reinforcement mechanism that allows for
template transfer. In particular, the glue that binds a simple game to other games,
is an evolved analogy between how the game treated its old inputs and how it treats
new inputs resulting from the play of the other games. Here is a rich experimental
example, accompanied by a simple computational model.
In a recent series of experiments, Livingstone et al. [2014] trained Rhesus macaque
monkeys to associate the number of dots on either side of a touch screen with the
number of food drops of reward the monkey would get if it selected that side of the
20See section 6 of (Barrett [2014b]) for further details regarding how an old ordering template
evolves to order a new type of stimuli on the incomplete evidence of only adjacent pairs of the
new stimuli.
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screen. They then trained the monkeys to associate symbols with the number of
food drops, to add the symbolically represented reward magnitudes, and to trans-
fer their learned arithmetic competence to a new set of symbols. We will briefly
discuss the experiments, then model the behavior of the monkeys by the modular
composition of two games. One game will involve ordering judgments, the other
addition.
The first experiment was a dots comparison task. Here the monkeys were pre-
sented with two circles on either side of the touch screen each containing randomly
placed dots of various sizes and colors. When a monkey touched a side of the screen,
it was rewarded with the number of liquid drops corresponding to the number of
dots on the side it chose. The device that fed the monkeys distinctly beeped once
as each drop was dispensed. The monkeys learned to choose the option with the
greater number of dots with an accuracy between 80% and 90%.
They were then trained on the first symbol comparison task. Here the experi-
menters associated a particular symbol with each cardinality from 0 through 25.
The symbols were neither cognates for the numbers nor did they exhibit any spe-
cial pattern. The monkeys were then presented with a symbol on each side of the
touch screen and were rewarded with a number of drops, each accompanied by a
beep, corresponding to the predetermined value of the symbol they selected. The
monkeys learned to choose the option with the greater number of dots with a high
degree of accuracy, particularly when there was a significant difference between the
value of the two symbols.
In the dots addition task, the monkeys were presented with one set of dots on
one side of the screen and two sets of dots on the other side of the screen, where
each set was specified by a circle around the dots. They were then rewarded in
drops, accompanied by beeps, for the total number of dots on the side of the screen
that they selected. Here the monkeys learned to reliably pick the larger of the
two options when the sum of cardinalities of the sets on one side of the screen was
significantly different from the cardinality of the set on the other. When the two
options were close in value, their behavior approached chance.
For the first symbol addition task, the monkeys were presented with two of the
symbols they had learned in the first symbol comparison task in an oval on one side
of the screen and a single symbol on the other side of the screen. The monkeys were
then rewarded in drops, accompanied by beeps, equal to the sum of the symbols in
the oval or the value of the single symbol respectively. Significantly, the monkeys
initially acted as if they were comparing the larger of the two addends against the
symbol on the other side of the screen. But they eventually learned to combine the
magnitudes represented by the two addends and reliably pick the larger of the two
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options when their sum was significantly different from the cardinality represented
on the other side of the screen.
Once the monkeys were successful at this task, a new set of symbols was intro-
duced in the second symbol comparison task. They successfully learned this new set
of symbols by comparison just as they had learned the first set of symbols in the
first symbol comparison task.
Finally, in order to determine whether the monkeys could transfer their arith-
metic competence with the old symbol set to the new symbol set, they were pre-
sented with a second symbol addition task where they were required to add the new
symbols just as in the first symbol addition task. The experimenters argued that if
the monkeys could learn to do so more efficiently than in the first symbol addition
task, this would indicate that they were able to transfer their arithmetic compe-
tence to a new system of representation, which might then be taken as evidence
that they were using the symbols as representations to carry out computations and
not just memorizing particular symbol combinations.
In the first symbol addition task, the monkeys reached a stable success rate after
about 50 days, but when presented with the second symbol addition task, the mon-
keys immediately chose the larger side more often than they did at a comparable
time during the first symbol addition task, and their performance reached a stable
success rate in just 10 days. The experimenters interpreted this as evidence that
the monkeys were able to transfer their previously learned competence at symbolic
arithmetic to a new context, and, hence, were carrying out computations on the
cardinalities represented by the symbols and not just memorizing symbol combina-
tions.
While it is unclear precisely what the monkeys were doing cognitively in each
task, one might model the evolution of such arithmetic competences using signaling
games, template transfer, and modular composition.
The dot comparison and the first and second symbol comparison tasks involve
the monkeys learning orderings of collections of dots and symbols just as the jays
learned orderings of colors. This can be modeled by a two-sender signaling game
similar to the one discussed in connection with the jays. Here each of the two
senders in the model, again, thought of as different functional elements of a single
animal agent, would have access to one side of the screen.
Template transfer illustrates how an ordering rule that evolved in one context
might come to be used successfully in another context, as in the second symbol
addition task where the monkeys learn to use the second symbol set in a way anal-
ogous to the first symbol set. Indeed, by means of template transfer, the monkeys
might learn the second symbol addition task more efficiently than they learned the
first symbol addition task without learning to carry out arithmetic computations.
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More specifically, they might learn successful combinations of symbols from the
first symbol set, then evolve an analogy between the old symbol set and the new
symbol set by template transfer.
If so, this poses a challenge to the experimenters’ conclusion that the second
symbol addition task involves computation. On the model just described, the com-
petence of the monkeys in the second symbol addition task is achieved by memo-
rization and template transfer, not computation. Further, template transfer here
also explains why the monkeys learned the second symbol addition task faster than
the first. On the other hand, transferring a learned rule of association from the
context in which it was learned to a new context by analogy might count as evolv-
ing a very basic type of concept. Here these concepts might represent cardinalities
and how they might be ordered.21
There are several ways that the monkeys might evolve to order dot-sums and
symbol-sums in the first place. They might evolve the ability to add the cardinalities
and order them all at once. Or they might learn how to add and how to order
separately, then learn how to compose these skills to carry out the addition-ordering
tasks set for the monkeys here.
In this second case, the dot addition and the first symbol addition tasks might be
modeled as the modular composition of two, more basic, evolutionary games. More
specifically, one might consider the composition of a two-sender ordering game very
much like the one discussed in the last section and a two-sender addition game that
evolves to compute the sums of the cardinalities presented to each sender.
We will consider the two-sender addition game first, then consider how that game
might evolve to communicate successfully with the two-sender ordering game.
In the two-sender addition game each sender is presented with a random set of
zero to five dots (or, equivalently, one of six symbols) where each cardinality has
equal probability. The senders then each send a signal to the receiver who performs
an action that depends on the signals. If that action corresponds to the sum of
cardinalities of the dots presented to the senders, then that particular play was
successful and the three agents, who can together be thought of as functional parts
of single composite agent, reinforce the conditional actions just taken.
We will suppose, as we did with the evolution of the ordering rule in the last
section, that the agents learn here by reinforcement with invention.22 Each sender
has six urns, one for each cardinality zero to five. Each urn initially contains just
21See (Barrett [2014b]) for a discussion of how the evolved appropriation of a rule might be
understood as the evolution of increasingly general concepts in the context of the ordering game
discussed above.
22Just as in the case of the order rule in the last section, using reinforcement with invention as
the adaptive dynamics here explains how the an appropriate representation of states and actions
might be invented.
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a single black ball. While there is always precisely one black ball in each of the
sender’s urns, other balls, labeled with terms corresponding to potential signals,
are added to the urns on repeated plays of the game. When presented with a set
of dots, each sender draws a ball at random from the corresponding urn. If the
ball is black, the sender invents a new term at random and sends that term to the
receiver; alternatively, if the ball is labeled with a term, the sender simply sends
that term to the receiver. On each play of the game, then, the receiver gets one
signal from each sender.
The receiver has an urn labeled by each pair of terms that he has received from
the senders so far, and he constructs further new urns as needed as the senders
invent and send new terms. Each of the receiver’s urns begins with eleven balls, one
ball corresponding to each possible sum action from zero to ten. When the receiver
gets the pair of signals from the sender, he draws a ball at random from the urn
corresponding to that particular pair of signals, then carries out the corresponding
act.
If the act matches the sum of the cardinalities of dots and neither sender drew
a black ball, then each agent returns the ball he drew to its urn and adds a copy
of that ball. If a sender drew a black ball and the receiver’s action was successful,
then the sender adds one ball of the new signal type he invented to each of his
urns, and the receiver adds urns corresponding to the new types of signals he may
receive. If the receiver’s action was not successful, the agents just return the balls
they drew to the urns. Note that once a new term is invented, the agents learn by
simple reinforcement without punishment.
On simulation, since the senders do not initially have much in their urns, they
draw the black ball often and, hence, begin by inventing new terms at a relatively
high rate. While they initially send the newly-invented terms at random, and the
receiver initially acts randomly when he receives a new pair of terms, as the agents
update their first-order dispositions by reinforcement, they typically evolve a set of
systematically interrelated dispositions where the receiver’s act corresponds to the
sum of the cardinalities presented to each of the senders.23 Here the senders’ terms
have evolved to represent cardinalities and the receiver’s dispositions have evolved
to add those cardinalities.
As with the birds, the agents in the game might be taken to represent various
functional parts of a single monkey. On this interpretation, the model illustrates
23In particular, on 1000 runs of 8.0× 106 plays each, the cumulative success rate is greater than
0.95 in 0.67 of the runs, greater than 0.90 in 0.83 of the runs, and greater than 0.85 in 0.95 of the
runs.
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how a monkey might coevolve an internal representation of cardinalities and the
ability to reliably calculate sums on the basis of this representation.24
Given that the monkeys possess such addition dispositions, which, as we have
just seen, might themselves evolve in the context of a signaling game, one might
model the behavior of the monkeys in the dot addition and the first symbol addition
tasks as the modular composition of a two-sender ordering game and a two-sender
addition game. Here the addition game takes its two inputs from the two sets of
dots on one side of the screen, then the ordering game takes one input from the
output action of the addition game and the other input from the dots on the other
side of the screen. If these games can evolve to communicate successfully, the result
will be a composite game where the monkeys sum the cardinalities on one side of
the screen, then compare this sum against the cardinality on the other side of the
screen and select the larger result.
Suppose that the addition game has evolved to compute the sum of inputs a and
b from the left side of the screen and produce an act corresponding to the sum.
And suppose that the comparison game has evolved to choose the greater of two
cardinalities l and r and is sensitive to the act a + b of the addition game and
the cardinality of the righthand side of the screen r. The comparison game has
evolved to add cardinalities of sets of dots, so, at least initially, it does not know
what to do with the act a + b of the addition game. In order to work together,
an association must evolve between the two modules. This can occur as a form of
template transfer.
When a set of dots is presented to the R input, the sender in the comparison
game sends whatever signal it has evolved to send. But when an act from the
addition game is presented to the L input of the comparison game, it is matched
up, at least initially, with a random signal.
Just as in the bird ordering template-transfer model, we will consider how the
analogy might evolve by reinforcement with punishment. Consider eleven transla-
tion urns labeled 0 to 10 corresponding to each of the possible act types resulting
from the addition game. Each urn initially has one ball each of each signal type
used in the comparison game labeled 0 to 10. When an action is presented to the
L input of the comparison game, a ball is drawn from the corresponding urn and
the signal corresponding to that ball is sent to the receiver of the comparison game
(Figure 5). If the comparison game judges the relative cardinalities of a + b and
r correctly, where either a + b > r or a + b < r in each case, then the translation
ball drawn is replaced in the urn from which it was drawn and a copy is added;
24See (Barrett [2013a]) for a model where the agents evolve the ability to add increasingly large
cardinalities. The sense in which this counts as an arithmetic computation is relatively weak, but
insofar as the agents can learn to transfer this rule to other contexts, it might, again, be thought
to represent a potentially general rule and hence an arithmetic computation.
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otherwise, the ball drawn is discarded unless it is the last ball of its type in that
urn.
Screen Modules Act
R
L
r
a
b
translation urns
a+ b > r
a+ b < r
comparison
game
addition
game
Figure 5. Modular composition of addition and ordering
On simulation, the addition and comparison games are found to be successfully
coordinated by reinforcement learning with punishment. With 1000 runs of 105
plays each, the composite system evolved to correctly order a + b and r with an
accuracy typically about 0.94 and always better than 0.90. And when it gets the
order wrong, the mean difference between a + b and r was 1.52. This agrees well
with the monkeys’ degree of success, and with their being more likely to make a
mistake when the cardinalities being compared are close.25
Part of the work is done by how the two modules are connected. Here we simply
stipulated in the specification of the composite game the stimuli to which the inputs
to the addition and ordering rules were sensitive without saying how the modules
might have come to be sensitive to those particular types of stimuli. There are,
however, considerations that may serve to limit the options.
In the case of chains of alarm calls, the question of what each agent attends to
was unproblematic. Alarm calls have been learned to deserve attention in simple
contexts, and one might expect this salience to transfer to more complicated chains
25Indeed, one should expect the latter phenomenon when a skill evolves by reinforcement on
ordering judgments since the composite agent needs not get the order exactly right to enjoy a
high degree of success. One might, consequently, expect the monkeys to exhibit more precise
addition behavior in an experiment where the success of their action on each play depends on
getting the sum exactly right rather than just getting an order judgment right.
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or networks of games. Further, the same features that make for a good signal,
chiefly that it is easily noticed given the de facto perceptual capacities of the agents,
may also make it salient to the agents responsible for the input to other modules.
More generally, the actions resulting from evolved modules are actions that have
mattered to payoffs. Insofar as agents attend to payoffs, then, such actions might
be similarly salient in similar contexts.
In short, whether it is more efficient to evolve a new capacity from scratch or by
modular composition will depend to a large degree on precisely what is salient to
the agents and how.
6. Relative Efficiency of Template Transfer
The modules in the bird transitive inference and monkey addition examples
evolved on reinforcement with invention and template transfer evolved on rein-
forcement with punishment. In order to compare the relative efficiency of template
transfer as directly as possible, we will consider a very simple logical game that
evolves on reinforcement learning, then compare this to template transfer on pre-
cisely the same learning dynamics.
The nand game is a two-sender, one receiver signaling game where the agents
learn by simple reinforcement. Nature randomly and independently picks a state 0
or 1 for each sender A and B. Let SA and SB be these states. Each sender has one
urn for each of the two possible states, and each urn starts with one ball indicating
signal g and one indicating signal r. The receiver R has one urn for each pair
of signals he might receive from the two senders: [gA, gB ], [gA, rB ], [rA, gB ], and
[rA, rB ], and each of these urns starts with one ball labeled 0 and one ball labeled
1. A play of the game is successful if and only if R performs the act corresponding
to SA nand SB ; that is, if R does act 0 when both SA and SB are 1 and does act
1 otherwise. If a play is successful, each agent returns the ball she drew to the urn
from which it was drawn and adds another of the same type; otherwise, each agent
simply returns the ball she drew.
The nand game typically coevolves a basic signaling language and the operator
nand. On 1000 runs with 106 plays/run, 0.71 of the runs exhibit a cumulative
success rate of better than 0.80, 0.62 of the runs better than 0.90, and 0.50 of the
runs better than 0.95. The game sometimes does not evolve nand. When it fails to
do so, every pair of states produce act 1, and the game is, consequently, successful
on about 0.75 of the plays.26
Once nand has evolved, it might be appropriated to a new context by template
transfer. For the purposes of direct comparison, we will also consider template
transfer in the context of simple reinforcement learning.
26This happens on about 0.23 of the runs with 107 plays/run.
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Suppose that nature presents each sender with a random state 0′ or 1′. Each
sender has two translation urns, one labeled 0′ and one labeled 1′, that each start
with one ball labeled 0 and one labeled 1. Each sender draws from the translation
urn corresponding to the current state presented to her, draws from the old urn
indicated on the ball drawn from the new translation urn, then sends the old signal
indicated by that draw to the receiver who, then, acts with whatever dispositions
he acquired when nand evolved in the old context. A play of this game is successful
if and only if the receiver preforms the act corresponding to SA
′ nand SB ′. If the
play is successful, each of the senders returns the ball she drew to the translation urn
from which it was drawn and adds another ball of that type; otherwise, each sender
simply returns the ball she drew. The receiver does not change his dispositions.
This template transfer game typically appropriates nand to the new context an
order of magnitude faster than the initial evolution of the logical operator on the
same dynamics. It does so by evolving a map from new inputs to old signals that
exploits the fact that the receiver’s dispositions have already evolved to calculate
nand on those signals. On 1000 runs with 105 plays/run, 0.78 of the runs exhibit a
cumulative success rate of better than 0.80, 0.61 of the runs better than 0.90, and
0.50 of the runs better than 0.95, which is about the same level of success that the
original nand game achieves on 106 plays/run.27
Template transfer also allows for a more subtle sort of efficiency. Once nand has
evolved, it may be appropriated to a new context by template transfer to play the
role of a different logical operator more efficiently than that operator might evolve
on its own. We will consider one example of this.
The operation or typically evolves on simple reinforcement learning just as in the
nand game. And, perhaps unsurprising given the similarity in their truth tables,
its evolution exhibits about the same efficiency on simulation.
Consider the template transfer of nand into a context where a play is successful
if and only if the receiver preforms the act corresponding to SA
′ or SB ′, and sup-
pose that the senders update their translation urns by simple reinforcement. On
simulation, the composite system evolves the logical operation or from nand an
order of magnitude faster than or evolves on the same dynamics. Template trans-
fer accomplishes this by mapping new inputs to old signals in such a way that the
receiver produces his 0 output in state (0, 0) instead of (1, 1). This works because
both logical operations produce 0 on exactly one pair of inputs.28
27For further comparison, on 105 plays/run in the original nand game, 0.60 of the runs exhibit
a cumulative success rate of better than 0.80, 0.48 of the runs better than 0.90, and 0.34 of the
runs better than 0.95. Like the nand game, the template transfer game also fails to evolve nand
for the new inputs on about 0.23 of the runs with 107 plays/run.
28This works the same way for the other two binary logical operators that produce one false. More
generally, if one had five binary logical operators, one for each possible number of false outputs,
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7. Discussion
The ritualization of decisions explains how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation,
and signaling games may initially evolve and and how new games may evolve from
old by polymerization, template transfer, and modular composition. These pro-
cesses are interrelated.
The ritualization of decisions explains how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation,
and signaling games may get started. An agent may condition his actions on some
aspect of nature, then learn from the consequences. An agent may condition his
actions on some aspect of nature and another condition her actions on the actions
of the first agent, then each learn from the consequences. An agent may learn to
manipulate the actions of another agent by taking advantage of the fixed dispo-
sitions of the second agent. Or agents may coevolve dispositions that coordinate
their actions to their mutual benefit. In each of these cases, the decisions that
result from the de facto dispositions of the agents form a game by ritualization.
Such games may eventually lead to stable, successful dispositions that implement
a rule. And such modular rules may, in turn, compose with each other by further
ritualization of decisions.
Polymerization is a simple case of modular composition. Chains of alarm calls
provide a compelling example of the sort of natural saliences that may serve to
connect modules that initially evolved independently. Given appropriate saliences,
ritualization of the sort that leads to cue reading, sensory manipulation, and signal-
ing explains how such modules might compose to allow for successful coordinated
action. The process of template transfer, in the examples described here, is a special
type of cue-reading that is particularly well suited to modular composition. And,
while the examples here involve a type of cue reading, template transfer might also
compose modules by the ritualization of decisions between agents akin to those that
form sensory-manipulation or signaling games.
Template transfer explains how a game or rule may come to function in a context
different from that in which it initially evolved. The appropriation of the module
to a new context involves the evolution of an analogy between the old inputs to the
game and the new inputs. The new inputs might come from nature or from the
actions of other agents. In the later case, a module may learn how to interpret the
actions of other modules as inputs to produce successful actions. Such functional
composition between modules may be more efficient than evolving the new capacity
from scratch.
one could get the other eleven by template transfer. And each would evolve an order of magnitude
faster this way than on its own.
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The evolution of strategies in a given game is a vibrant area of ongoing research.
But the question of the evolution of games themselves is important and deserves to
be explored. Here we have taken a few initial steps.
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